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On the background of an online/ofﬂine dual channel, this paper studies contract coordination of cen-
tralized and decentralized dual-channel closed-loop supply chains. With the feature of recycle rate
ﬂuctuation, we develop a revenue-sharing mechanism by taking the relationship between the recycle
rate and the recycle revenue sharing ratio into consideration. After comparing of centralized decision and
the manufacturing led decentralized decision, the optimal online/ofﬂine price, wholesale price and ad-
vertising investment are derived. The inﬂuence of revenue sharing ratio in forward and reverse channels
on the online/ofﬂine prices and wholesale prices is discussed. The numeric example is used for observing
the relationship between variables, and between the optimal proﬁt and variables through analysis of
changing parameter valuations.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the era of E-commerce, many enterprises choose to develop
an online channel for direct sales with the traditional retail
channel being maintained to establish an online/ofﬂine dual-
channel distribution system. In the dual-channel of supply chains
(SCs), manufacturers not only work as the upstream suppliers, but
also as the peer competitors on the same level. On one hand,
manufacturers control the scale of traditional retail channels by
establishing online routes to restrict the retailers’ bargaining
power. On the other hand, traditional retail channels continue to
play an irreplaceable role: the brand effect is cultivated by pro-
viding ofﬂine service support, customer experience and product
maintenance, and the customers’ post-market service demands
are therefore created and satisﬁed.
By comparing the prices and proﬁts under three modes—on-
line, ofﬂine and mixed channels—and discussing the effect of cost
structure and elasticity of demand in pricing, Park and Keh (2003)
believe that manufacturers adopting a mixed channel strategy can
reduce retail price, boost demand and increase the total proﬁt of
both the manufacturer and the SC. These days, manufacturers
constantly devote themselves to improving the shopping experi-
ence and aftermarket service of physical retail stores, withanagement School, Shanghai
hanghai, PR China.
),
Ieromonachou).
oordination contracts of d
n Economics (2016), http://focusing on service competition strategy rather than price com-
petition strategy. For the purpose of reducing the negative effects
of the online channel for direct sales on the ofﬂine retail channel,
some manufacturers seek cooperation relating to market service
support, such as part exchange and product repair, so that retailers
will be able to gain service beneﬁts from E-channels. Dan et al.
(2012) study the dual-channel of a conventional SC where retailer
provides service and decides the pricing and service strategy. They
conclude that retailers should increase the retail price as a result of
improved service and the manufacturer's pricing strategy depends
on consumer loyalty.
On the other hand, an enterprise's environmental responsibility
has become an inescapable practical problem. Remanufacturing
saves costs and the recycling of used products contributes to in-
creased proﬁts, so manufacturing enterprises tend to recycle used
products in a more active way and implement closed-loop supply
chains (CLSC). Savaskan et al. (2004) discuss three different re-
cycling scenarios where manufacturers, retailers and third parties
playing a leading role respectively. By comparing the impact of
wholesale price, retail price and recycle rate on the total proﬁt of
CLSC under these three scenarios, the study shows that manu-
factures’ proﬁt is maximized when recycling led by the retailer.
Jing and Bell (2012) discuss whether the recycling channel and
recycling price would affect retailers’ pricing and order decisions,
with return rate, return cost and consumers’ return preferences as
parameters in the study. They conclude that the recycling me-
chanism could improve proﬁts for retailers.
For advertising investment decisions, Yue et al. (2006) and Xieual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
Nomenclature
Q Total market demand when the dual-channel product
price and advertising investment levels are zero
A Recycling channel input
c Unit manufacturing cost
s Unit cost saving by remanufacturing
β Intrinsic price elastic coefﬁcient
δ Cross-price elastic coefﬁcient, δ β< <0
k Advertising effect, the inﬂuence factor of advertising
investment on total market demand, >k 0
i Recycle rate for used products
ρ Consumers’ preference for the ofﬂine channel,
ρ≤ ≤0 1
ρ−1 Consumers’ preference for the online channel
α The advertising expense proportion assumed by the
manufacturer, α≤ ≤0 1
α−1 The advertising expense proportion assumed by the
retailer
Variables
Pt 1 Ofﬂine price
Pe Online price, >P Pt e
w Wholesale price
b Total advertising investment of the dual-channel SC
Φ1 Revenue sharing ratio in forward channel—RSR-FC,
the ratio of manufacturer shares sales revenue from an
ofﬂine channel of the retailer, ≤ Φ ≤0 11
Φ2 Revenue sharing ratio in reverse channel—RSR-RC, the
ratio of retailer shares remanufacturing cost savings
from recycling, ≤ Φ ≤0 12
Fig. 1. Revenue-sharing decision model of cooperation advertising in a dual-
channel CLSC.
J. Xie et al. / Int. J. Production Economics ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎2and Wei (2009) analyze the optimal price and advertising deci-
sions in a conventional forward SC of the ofﬂine channel when
market demand is affected by price and advertising investment;
while Szmerekovsky and Zhang (2009) look for the optimal deci-
sion when both the manufacturer and retailer invested in adver-
tising. Pietro (2014) claims green advertising investment helps
establish commercial goodwill for both manufacturer and retailer.
So it can stimulate investment for green advertising if reverse
revenue sharing contract is adopted in reverse supply-chain of
closed-loop supply chain. Yi and Xiao (2012) construct a CLSC
game theory model of certain demands under the inﬂuence of
advertising, and discuss optimal pricing, advertising investment
and recycle rate decisions as well as the coordination method.
However, most scholars discuss the optimal pricing decision and
cooperation advertising strategies in a dual-channel forward SC
based on the assumption that demand is only affected by adver-
tising; the inﬂuence of the competitive channel price on the
channel price itself is not covered in the demand function. In fact,
advertising investment will not increase product demand, but
change the distribution of product demand in different channels.
“Double marginalization” decided by channel members exist in
dual-channel closed-loop networks. After comparison and analysis
of revenue-sharing contracts, buyback contracts and wholesale
price contracts, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) conclude that rev-
enue-sharing contracts can coordinate the SC channel and de-
termine the retail price and the retailers’ pricing, which is better
than the coordination of buyback and discount contracts in a
single case; besides, in revenue-sharing contracts, SC proﬁts can be
divided arbitrarily instead of depending on the retailers’ order
quantity and price option. Yan and Pei (2011) show that although
retailers and manufacturers could share the information about
consumer demand, only manufacturers could beneﬁt from the
information sharing, while the retailer unaffected. Altug (2016)
discusses the impaction of revenue sharing contract in contract
design from the perspective of cost. He regards cost as added value
for contractor. Different types of revenue sharing brings different
cost in the process of executing contract. Xu et al. (2014) establish
a dual-channel supply chain coordinating contract, which consists
of a two-way revenue sharing contract. Manufacturer gets a frac-
tion of the revenue generated by retailer's channel in the tradi-
tional revenue sharing contract, while retailer gets a fraction of the
revenue generated by manufacturer's direct channel in the reverse
revenue sharing contract. However they do not consider recycling
and remanufacturing, as well as sharing for remanufacturing cost
savings. Yi and Yuan (2012) research on the inﬂuence of channelPlease cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://conﬂict on CLSC coordination in mixed sales channels. Therefore,
for node enterprises in dual-channel closed-loop distribution
networks, eliminating channel conﬂict and double marginalization
has been a new eminent task.
Some manufacturers have already adopted a differential price
strategy and service strategy in order to relieve the competition
conﬂict between manufacturers and retailers. The mode has re-
lieved channel conﬂict to a certain degree, but will it resolve dual
marginalization altogether? How much do centralized versus de-
centralized decisions differentiate? And how are the proﬁts of all
members of the SC reallocated and reach a better recycle rate by
determining a reasonable revenue sharing ratio in the CLSC? These
are the questions studied and answered in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the problem description and model. In Section 3,
channel conﬂict coordination model of cooperative advertising in
centralized CLSC is discussed, followed by the numerical analysis.
Section 4 presents discussion of channel conﬂict coordination
model of cooperation advertising in decentralized CLSC, as well as
comparing with the performance in centralized CLSC. Section 5
summarizes the ﬁndings.2. Problem description and model
2.1. Problem description
Fig. 1 shows a dual-channel CLSC consisting of single manu-
facturer/single retailer. The sales channel of this kind is about the
simultaneous online and ofﬂine sales of certain products produced
by the manufacturer at unit cost c. The manufacturer wholesales
the product to the retailer in the wholesale price w through the
ofﬂine channel, the retailer sells the product to consumers at the
ofﬂine price Pt and the manufacturer sells the product to con-
sumers at the direct sale price Pe through the online channel. Totalual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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advertising expense proportion assumed by the retailer is 1α,
then the proportion assumed by the manufacturer is α.
Manufacturers can recycle a certain percentage of used pro-
ducts that are at the end of their service life, and the recycle rate is
i. The remanufacturing cost is lower than the manufacturing cost
of new products, s is the cost saved for the manufacturer by re-
cycling 1 unit of used products. To encourage the retailers to assist
in recycling, the manufacturer will share its remanufacturing cost
savings with the retailer. Wei and Choi (2012) believe that SC
proﬁts can be optimized through the wholesale price discount and
revenue-sharing contract, and, what is more, the wholesale price
decreases as the revenue-sharing proportion increases. Adopting
the model from Cachon and Lariviere (2005), that revenue-sharing
contract can coordinate the forward SC, we consider the compe-
tition relationship between manufacturer and retailer in dual-
channel SC during a sale process. A dual revenue-sharing contract
dominated by the manufacturer is hereby designed: the retailer
shares Φ2 proportion of remanufacturing cost savings from re-
cycling, i.e. revenue-sharing ratio in reverse channel (RSR-RC); the
manufacturer enjoys Φ1 proportion of sales revenue from an off-
line channel of the retailer. i.e. revenue sharing ratio in forward
channel (regular channel) (RSR-FC). Both the channel revenue-
sharing coefﬁcient Φ1 and Φ2 are larger than 0 and smaller than 1.
2.2. Mathematical model
Niu et al. (2012) recognize that demand for both an online
channel for direct sales and a traditional retail channel was the
same, and in accordance with the linear demand function in
general; however, E-sale and a traditional retail channel are dis-
tinguished by the price sensitivity, and the studied dual-channel
pricing and ordering decision-making are different in terms of
channel price. In the study of competitive pricing determined by
total market demand, Gallego and Hu (2014) also believe that the
demand function in the price game satisﬁed the linear relation-
ship. On the other hand, advertising realizes product publicity and
increases consumers’ awareness of the product, so that consumers’
total market demand increases. Therefore, in this paper, we as-
sumed that demands are affected by dual-channel price and ad-
vertising investment at the same time. In the demand function, the
effect of advertising investment on demand k b is a convex
function with respect to b, which is consistent with the effect of
advertising on demand in the research conducted by Horsky and
Simon (1983). Hence, the deﬁnition of online/ofﬂine channel de-
mand is as shown in the Eqs. (1) and (2):
( )ρ β δ= + − + ( )D Q k b P PThe demand of offline channel is 1t t e
( )ρ β δ= − ( + ) − + ( )D Q k b P PThe demand of online channel is 1 2e e t
where subscript t stands for ofﬂine channel, subscript e for online
channel and Q for total market demand when the dual-channel
product price and advertising investment levels are zero.
ρ ρ−and 1 refer to the consumers’ preference for the ofﬂine
channel and online channel respectively, and ρ≤ ≤0 1.
Hua et al. (2010) and Peng et al. (2015) assume that the in-
trinsic price elastic coefﬁcient and cross-price elastic coefﬁcient of
channels are symmetric, which means different channels have the
same intrinsic price elastic coefﬁcient and cross-price elastic
coefﬁcient. This paper quotes this conclusion for the convenience
of analysis. In the equations, β stands for the intrinsic price elasticPlease cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://coefﬁcient, δ for cross-price elastic coefﬁcient, and δ β< <0 means
demand is affected by the intrinsic price in a more signiﬁcant
manner than the price of another channel. k is the inﬂuence factor
of advertising investment on total market demand, i.e. advertising
effect, and >k 0.
The quantity of used products recycled by retailers is relevant
to the quantity of recycling sites. The more recycling sites, the
more recycled products. So the recycling quantity is positively
correlated to recycling channel input of retailers’. However, due to
diminishing marginal effect of channel input; i.e. the recycling rate
i is deﬁned as a concave function of recycling channel input. Thus,
A is introduced in this paper as recycling channel input. By refer-
ring to Savaskan et al. (2004), γ=i A , where γ is input coefﬁcient.
In addition, recycling channel input A increases when Φ2 increases.
Therefore, the recycling rate i is a variable and is the function of
Φ2. In previous literatures (Xing et al., 2007), the recycling channel
input is an exponential function of Φ2, i.e. θ= (θ>ΦA e 02 ), and
γ θ γ θ= =Φ Φi e e2 12 2 , recorded as μ γ θ= , and μ= Φi e 12 2, μ > 0.
As the cost saving of recycling is high and shared by the retailer,
the more active the retailer becomes in recycling, and, as a result,
the recycling rate of used products increases. Therefore, the re-
cycling rate is correlated with RSR-RC, and the correlation is used
to study the pricing optimization in centralized and decentralized
decision-making.
Assume the retailer ordering quantity is equal to the sum of
sales through both ofﬂine and online channels. And the sales
through two channels is equal to the demand of online and ofﬂine
channels respectively. The proﬁt function of the manufacturer,
retailer and SC—without considering storage and inventory costs
—is as below:
The proﬁt function of the manufacturer:
( )( )π μ α= + + Φ + ( − Φ ) − + − ( )ΦwD P D P D s e c D D b1 3M t e e t t t e1 2 12 2
The proﬁt function of the retailer:
( )π μ α=( − Φ ) − +Φ + −( − ) ( )ΦP D wD s e D D b1 1 4R t t t t e1 2 12 2
where the manufacturer's revenue consists of the wholesale rev-
enue to retailers wDt , the online sales revenue P De e, the fraction of
remanufacturing cost saving the manufacturer keeps
( )μ( − Φ ) +Φs e D D1 t e2 12 2 , and the share from the retailer's ofﬂine
sales revenue Φ P Dt t1 ; It's expenditure consists of the manu-
facturing cost ( )+c D Dt e and the advertising investment αb;
Also, the retailer's revenue consists of the fraction of ofﬂine
sales revenue the retailer keeps ( − Φ )P D1 t t1 and the share from
remanufacturing cost saving ( )μΦ +Φs e D Dt e2 12 2 ; It's expenditure
consists of the payment for products wDt and advertising invest-
ment α( − )b1 .
The proﬁt function of the SC:
( ) ( )π μ= + − + + + − ( )ΦP D P D c D D s e D D b 5e e t t t e t e12 2
where the whole revenue of SC consists of online/ofﬂine sales
revenue +P D P De e t t and the remanufacturing cost saving
( )μ +Φs e D Dt e12 2 ; The SC expenditure consists of manufacturing cost
( )+c D Dt e and the advertising investment b. RSR-RC, Φ ,2 could still
affect the SC proﬁts because the recycling rate i is not ﬁxed and in
correlation with revenue sharing of retailers’ in reverse SC, which
is different from the viewpoints in previous research (Quariguasi-
Frota-Neto and Bloemhof, 2011; Debo et al., 2006) with premise
for ﬁxed recycling rate.ual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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tising in centralized CLSC
3.1. Centralized decision model and solution of the model
By substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into (5), the proﬁt function of
the SC under centralized decision is:
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ( )
( )(
π ρ δ β ρ β δ
μ δ β
= − + + − + − ) − + − +
+ + + − + ) − ( )
Φ
P c Q k b P P P c Q k b P P
s e Q k b P P b
1
6
t e t e e t
t e
1
2 2
As the cost-saving beneﬁting from recycling and re-
manufacturing is affected by the RSR-RC, it can be said that under
the centralized decision model, the total SC proﬁt is inﬂuenced by
the RSR-RC. This conclusion is different from conventional SC
(Krishnan and Winter, 2011; Wang et al., 2004) the revenue-
sharing contract of which is not impacted by allocation ratio
coefﬁcient in the overall SC proﬁt function. In Eq. (6), the ﬁrst item
represents the product's selling proﬁt in the ofﬂine channel, the
second item represents the product's selling proﬁt in the online
channel, the third item represents the product yield of the re-
cycling channel, and the fourth item represents the advertising
investment of the SC.
The optimal online price Pe and ofﬂine price Pt of dual-channel
supply chain can be obtained with ﬁrst-order optimality
conditions.
Suppose π π∂
∂
= ∂
∂
=
P P
0, 0
t e
, π∂
∂
=
b
0, so
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
π β δ ρ β δ μ β δ
π β δ ρ β δ μ β δ
π ρ μ
∂
∂
= − + + + + − − − =
∂
∂
= − + + − + + − − − =
∂
∂
= ( + − − + − =
Φ
Φ
Φ
P
P P Q k b c c s e
P
P P Q k b c c s e
b
k P P c s e b
2 2 0
2 2 1 0
1 2 0
t
t e t
e
e t e
t e
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
By solving the equations we can obtain expressions of the
unique optimal online price Pe and ofﬂine price Pt aw well as
critical advertising investment value *bo :
( ) ( )= + + ( )*P b
N Q k b G
2 7e
c
( ) ( )= + + ( )*P b
M Q k b G
2 8t
c
( )
( )
μ
* = −
+ −
− ( )
Φ
b
k QA s e c
k A
4
4 1 9
o 2
1
2 2
where ( )
( )( ) ( ) )(μ= = = − =βρ δ ρ
β δ
δρ β ρ
β δ
β ρ β δ ρ
β δ
+ −
−
+ −
−
Φ − − −
−
M N G c e A, , s ,
1 1 2 1
42 2 2 2
1
2 2
2 2
Theorem 1. π ( Φ )P P b, , ,t e 2 , the total proﬁt of a centralized CLSC is
a strictly concave function with respect to b , and also the strictly
combined concave function with respect to P Pandt e, but is not a
combined concave function with respect to ΦP P b, , ,t e 2
[Appendix A].
Theorem 2. For the given advertising investment b and revenue
sharing ratio Φ2, the centralized CLSC has a unique optimal online
price *Pe
c and ofﬂine price *Pt
c .
Theorem 3. Advertising investment has a unique critical value *bo ,
and the optimal SC proﬁt exists. The optimal proﬁt of the SC is:Please cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
( )( )
( ) ( )π μ
μ β δ μ
* Φ = − + + −
× + +
−
+ − − ( )
Φ
Φ
Φ
b k A b QA
s e c
k b AQ
s e c Q
s e c
, 1 2
2
2 2 10
2
2 2
2 12
2
1
2 2
1
2 2
2
3.2. The property analysis to the solutions of the centralized decision
model
In this section we discuss property for optimal online/ofﬂine
price, optimal advertising investment, and optimal proﬁt of the SC.
It can be shown that all above optimal solutions are affected by
RSR-RC or consumers' preferences.
3.2.1. The property analysis to optimal online/ofﬂine price
Take the derivatives of the expressions of *Pe
c and *Pt
c with re-
spect to b , and it can be solved that:
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )ρ
β δ
= >
= >
− =
−
+
*
*
* *
dP b
d b
k
N
dP b
d b
k
M
dP b
d b
dP b
d b
k
2
0
2
0
2 1
e
c
t
c
t
c
e
c
Property 1. The optimal online/ofﬂine price increases as adver-
tising investment increases, and increased amount relates to
consumers’ preference for online or ofﬂine channels.
The price of the channel consumers preferred changes more
signiﬁcantly with respect to the advertising investment of the
channel, compared to the changes in the other channel, i.e. if
( )>
*
0
dP b
d b
e
c
, ( )>* 0dP b
d b
t
c
, when ρ< <0 1
2
,
( )( ) <*
*dP b
d b
dP b
d b
t
c e
c
; when ρ≥ 1
2
,
( )( )≥*
*dP b
d b
dP b
d b
t
c e
c
, which indicates that the optimal online or ofﬂine
price increases as advertising investment increases. Increase in
advertising investment will boost the demand of each channel and
lead to the price increase in the online and ofﬂine channels. Under
the condition that extent of advertising affect demand is same
between different channels, if consumers prefer online channel,
increased demand of online channel will be greater than that of
ofﬂine channel. Therefore, optimal online price increases faster
than that of ofﬂine price. Vice versa.
Property 2. The optimal price changes according to consumers’
preferences. Firstly, the optimal price of the consumers’ preferred
channel is higher than that of the other channel. Secondly, the
optimal ofﬂine channel price increases when consumers’ pre-
ference for the ofﬂine channel increases, while the online price
increases as consumers’ preference for the ofﬂine channel de-
crease, and the range of variation is the same but in opposite
direction.
(1) When ρ< <0 1
2
, ( ) ( )<* *P b P btc ec ; when ρ ≥ 12 , then
( ) ( )≥* *P b P btc ec . It can be concluded that if consumers’
preference for the ofﬂine channel is smaller than 0.5, which
means consumers prefer to buy products through the online
channel, the optimal online price will be higher than the op-
timal ofﬂine price no matter how much is invested in adver-
tising by the SC. Otherwise, the optimal ofﬂine price will beual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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(2) Derivative of the optimal online price and ofﬂine price with
respect to the channel preference coefﬁcient:
( ) ( ) ( )ρ ρ β δ= − = ( + ) + >
d b
d
d b
d
Q k b
P P 1
2
0
t
c
e
c
The reason is that the demand for the ofﬂine channel rises
when consumers’ preference for the ofﬂine channel increases. As a
result, the product price of the ofﬂine channel rises. In the same
way, demand for the online channel decreases and the product
price of the online channel drops. The intrinsic price elasticity and
cross-price elasticity of different channels are equal. Therefore, the
rate of change of optimal prices is equal, but the direction of
change is opposite.
Property 3. Both the optimal online and ofﬂine prices are
monotonically decreasing functions with respect to the RSR-RC;
the larger the RSR-RC, the lower the optimal online/ofﬂine price.
( ) ( )
Φ
=
Φ
= − <
Φd b
d
d b
d
sue
P P 1
4
0
e
c
t
c
2 2
2
2
The conclusion in Property 3 is not straightforward. When
optimal online and ofﬂine prices are realized in the SC under a
speciﬁc RSR-RC, the marginal cost per unit should be the same
with the marginal proﬁt; the increase of RSR-RC improves re-
tailers’ used product recycling rates and generates more cost
saving(s) in the SC, making the unit marginal contribution larger
than the unit marginal cost. At the same time, the optimal online
or ofﬂine price in the SC inevitably decreases until the marginal
cost and marginal proﬁt become equal again according to the Law
of Diminishing Marginal Returns, which will boost market
demand.
3.2.2. The property analysis to optimal advertising investment
Property 4. The relationship between optimal advertising in-
vestment and RSR-RC depends on advertising effect and is
uncertain.( )μ*Φ =
− −
Φ −d
d
ks e
k A
b
8
1o
2
2 1
1
2 2
When − < >*Φk A 1 0, 0
d
d
2 bo
2
, the optimal advertising investment is a
monotonically increasing function with respect to the RSR-RC, so
the larger the RSR-RC, the larger the adverting investment.
When − ≥ <*Φk A 1 0, 0
d
d
2 bo
2
, the optimal advertising investment is
a monotonically decreasing function with respect to the RSR-RC, so
the larger the RSR-RC, the smaller the adverting investment.
3.2.3. The property analysis to optimal proﬁt of the SC
It can be learned from Theorem 3 that the optimal SC proﬁt
exists, shown in Formula (10). Take the derivatives of Formula (10)
with respect to Φ2:
( )( ) ( )π μ β δ μ β δ* ΦΦ = ( − ) + + − −Φ Φd d s e s e k b Q c14 2 222 12 122 2
Then we can get:
Property 5. The relationship between optimal proﬁt and RSR-RC
is not certain. It depends on total market demand and RSR-RC.Please cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://( )β δ
β δ μ
=
+ − −
( − )
k b Q c
s
Suppose W
2
2
.
(1) if Φ > ln W22 when ( )β δ< < − −Q c k b0 2 , then ( ) >π ΦΦ 0d d 22 , and
the optimal proﬁt of the SC is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to the RSR-RC; if Φ< < ln W0 22 then
( ) <π ΦΦ 0
d
d
2
2
, and the optimal proﬁt of the SC is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to the RSR-RC.
(2) ( ) >π ΦΦ 0
d
d
2
2
holds when ( )β δ> − −c k bQ 2 , and the optimal proﬁt
of the SC is a monotonically decreasing function with respect
to the RSR-RC.
Property 6. The relationship between optimal proﬁt and adver-
tising investment is not certain and depends on advertising effect.
When advertising investment is the critical value, shown in
Formula (9), the SC obtains its optimal proﬁt, shown in Formula
(10).
Then,
(1) When − <k A 1 02 , the total proﬁt of the SC is a concave
function with respect to advertising investment on [0, +∞].
The optimal advertising investment is *bo and the optimal
proﬁt of the SC is ( )π *bc o .
(2) When − ≥k A 1 02 , the total proﬁt of the SC is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to advertising investment on
[0,+∞]. The larger the advertising investment, the larger the
SC proﬁt.
It can be learned from Property 6 that there is a critical value of
advertising affect A1/ . When the inﬂuence factor of advertising
investment to total market demand k is smaller than the critical
value, the advertising investment has an optimal level, *bo , re-
sulting in the SC reaching its proﬁt. This means that the adver-
tising effect makes SC proﬁts increase with less advertising in-
vestment. On the other hand, when advertising investment ex-
ceeds *bo , the SC proﬁt decreases since returns on increased sale
is not able to cover the advertising cost. When k is larger than the
critical value the advertising effect is sufﬁciently strong and the
total proﬁt of the SC is continuously increasing. Returns on in-
creased sale will cover the advertising cost no matter how much is
invested in advertising.
3.3. Numerical analysis of centralized decision model with recycle
rate change
Suppose the values of parameters in the model are Q¼500,
b¼400, c¼10, s¼3, μ¼0.8, β¼8.5 and δ¼4.5. In the previous
analysis, advertising effect k has a critical value, A1/ , and the
relationship between different variables are affected when k is
within different ranges. Therefore, if we suppose =k 4 and
− <k A 1 02 , the preference is ρ = 0. 4 and the range of RSR-RC is
[0,1], with other parameters maintained in our analysis to verify
the relationship between online and ofﬂine prices, optimal ad-
vertising investment, total SC proﬁt and RSR-RC.
3.3.1. Relationship between the optimal online/ofﬂine price and RSR-
RC
It can be known from Fig. 2 that the optimal online and ofﬂine
prices are monotonically decreasing functions with respect to theual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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Fig. 2. Relationship between the optimal Online/Ofﬂine Price and RSR-RC.
Fig. 3. Relationship between the optimal SC proﬁt/optimal advertising investment
and RSR-RC.
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3.3.2. Relationship between the optimal SC proﬁt/optimal advertising
investment and RSR-RC
It can be known from Fig. 3 that when k is small, that is k2
A1o0, then the optimal advertising investment is a mono-
tonically increasing function with respect to the RSR-RC, which
conforms to the conclusion in Property 4. When market demand is
large and k is small, then the optimal SC proﬁt is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to the RSR-RC, which conforms to
the conclusion in Property 5. Different from the premise of ﬁxed
recycling rate of used products in previous research (Quariguasi-
Frota-Neto and Bloemhof, 2011; Debo et al., 2006), the recycling
rate in this paper is affected by recycling channel input. Mean-
while, channel input is affected by revenue sharing of retailers in
reverse SC. Thus, the SC proﬁts are affected by production costs
and sales price as well as RSR-RC. Furthermore, the larger the RSR-
RC, the larger the adverting investment and SC proﬁts. It solves the
optimal pricing issues of O2O dual-channel CLSC with cooperative
advertisement, which can be considered as extension for former
research.4. Channel conﬂict coordination model of cooperation adver-
tising in decentralized CLSC
4.1. Decentralized decision model and solution of the model
Under the circumstances of decentralized decision-making,Please cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://suppose the manufacturer and retailer are parties in the Stackel-
berg game theory, with the manufacturer as the dominant party
and the retailer as the following party. The manufacturer decides
the allocation ratios Φ Φ,1 2, the online and wholesale prices, and
the advertising investment, then the retailer determines the off-
line price accordingly.
The proﬁt function of the manufacturer:
⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
π Φ ρ β δ
ρ β δ
Φ μ δ β α
= + + − +
+ − + − +
+ − − + ( − )( + ) + −Φ
11
P w Q k b P P
P Q k b P P
s e c Q P P k b b
1
1
M t t e
e e t
t e
1
2
1
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The proﬁt function of the retailer:
( )( )
( )
π ρ β δ
μ δ β α
= (( − Φ ) − ) + − +
+ Φ + ( − )( + ) + − ( − ) ( )
Φ
P w Q k b P P
s e Q P P k b b
1
1 12
R t t e
t e
1
2
1
2 2
Theorem 4. In the cooperative decision model of channel conﬂict
coordination in decentralized CLSCs, the manufacturer's proﬁt func-
tion is a strictly combined concave function with respect to Pe and w,
but not a combined concave function with respect to Φ ΦP w b, , ,e 1, 2.
First of all, resolve the ﬁrst derivative of πR with respect to Pt
with backward induction, the optimal ofﬂine price is resolved
thus:
⎡⎣
⎤
⎦⎥
( )
( )
β
δ β ρ
μ δ β
* =
( − Φ )
( − Φ ) + + + ( − Φ )
+Φ − ( )
Φ
P w Q k b
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P
1
2 1
1 1
13
t e
1
1 1
2
1
2 2
By substituting Eq. (13) into (11), the manufacturer's proﬁt
function is:
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For any given advertising investment b, and RSR-FC and RSR-RC
Φ Φ1, 2, the optimal online price and wholesale price of dual-chan-
nel SCs can be obtained with ﬁrst-order optimality conditions.
Furthermore, in the cooperative extension model of decentralized
dual-channel CLSCs, the manufacturer's online price should be
higher than the wholesale price. Otherwise retailers are able to
buy products directly through the online channel, which makes
the ofﬂine channel disappear, i.e. >P we .
The Lagrange multiplier λ is then introduced to establish theual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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We then resolve the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives with respect
to P wande , and reduce them to 0 to obtain Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions for the manufacturer's optimization problem [Appendix B].
Since >P we , only the condition under λ=0 can be adopted. It can
be obtained by resolving the manufacturer's optimization problem
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions that:
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Retailers and manufacturers are willing to implement a con-
tract only when π π π π+ > +Δ Δ * *M R Mc Rc . Meanwhile, substitute the
expressions of Δ Δ ΔP w P, ,e t into (11) and (12) to resolve the proﬁt
function expressions of the manufacturer and the retailer. The
proﬁt functions of manufacturers’ and retailers’ are complicated,
so we do not list them here. The relationship between RSR-FC and
RSR-RC and manufacturer's proﬁt, retailer's proﬁt and SC proﬁt
under decentralized decision are analyzed with values in Part 4.3.4.2. Property analysis of the solutions of the decentralized decision
modelProperty 7. The optimal ofﬂine price of retailer increases as the
advertising investment increases; it decreases as the RSR-FC in-
creases, but the relationship between it and the RSR-RC is not
explicit.
Take the derivatives of Formula (17) with respect to Φ Φb , ,1 2
and it can be solved that:Please cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://⎜ ⎟
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The sign of ( )( )μ δ= Φ + −β β δΦ Φ −−ΦΔ s e 1dPd 14 2 2t2 12 2 1 is not explicit, but
correlated with the values of Φ1, Φ2, β and δ .
It can be seen from Property 7 that an increase in advertising
investment can realize an increase in ofﬂine demand, so that re-
tailers can price higher ofﬂine, which is easy to understand; while
the negative correlation between the optimal ofﬂine price of re-
tailers and RSR-FC is not as straightforward. We think the reason
for this is that retailers’ returns decrease following the rise in the
RSR-FC and, as a result, they have to lower the price to accelerate
sales and thus increase returns, as there is only the online sales
channel in competition with retailers without considering price
elasticity of product demand.
Property 8. Manufacturers’ optimal online price rises as the ad-
vertising investment and RSR-RC increase, but it is not correlated
with the RSR-FC.
By taking the derivatives of Eq. (15) with respect to Φ Φb , ,1 2, it
can be solved that:
( ) ( )
μ
= >
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Φ
=
Φ
=
μ
Δ
Δ Φ
Δ
+ + − − Φ Φ
dP
d b
Nk
dP
d
s e
dP
d d
2
0
1
4
0
d
0
e
e
e
N Q k b c s e
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2 2
2
1
2 2
According to Property 8, a manufacturer's optimal online price
rises as advertising investment increases, for manufacturers can
set higher online prices when online demand increases along with
a rise in advertising investment. A manufacturer's optimal online
price is positively correlated with RSR-RC; the reason for this being
that retailers are more active in the recycling of used products as
RSR-RC increases. In other words, retailers are more dedicated in
order to gain beneﬁt from recycling activities when ofﬂine sales
proﬁt and recycling proﬁt are also presence. This will weaken the
effect of competition between ofﬂine and online sales channels,
therefore, manufacturers can increase online prices to bring an
increase in sales revenue without considering price elasticity of
product demand.
Property 9. The online and ofﬂine prices under decentralized
decisions are higher than those under centralized decisions [Ap-
pendix C].
By comparing ( )* bPec and ( )∆ bPe , ( )* bPtc and ( )∆ bPt , it can
be concluded that:
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Property 9 indicates that both the manufacturer's price and the
retailer's price under decentralized decisions are higher than those
under centralized decisions, which means SC coordination is not
realized under decentralized decisions, unlike under centralized
decisions. In previous literatures (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005),ual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
Fig. 5. Relationship between the manufacturer's proﬁt and the RSR-FC/RSR-RC.
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the retailer's proﬁt and the RSR-FC/RSR-RC.
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ginalization between manufacturers and retailers, and realize SC
coordination compared with wholesale contracts, we think double
marginalization still exists in revenue-sharing contracts under
decentralized decisions. With the revenue allocation ratio de-
termined, manufacturers and retailers seek to maximize their own
proﬁts through price decisions in the channel directly facing end-
consumers.
4.3. Value analysis of decentralized decisions
For the purposes of this analysis, suppose the RSR-RC is Φ =0.42 ,
consumers’ preference for the ofﬂine channel is ρ=0. 4, advertising
investment is b¼400 and other parameters remain unchanged.
4.3.1. Relationship between optimal online/ofﬂine price, optimal
wholesale price and the RSR-FC
The relationship between the optimal online/ofﬂine price, the
optimal wholesale price and the RSR-FC is shown in Fig. 4.
We can learn that the optimal online price is not correlative
with the RSR-FC; the optimal ofﬂine price is a decreasing function
with respect to RSR-FC. The optimal wholesale price is a convex
function with respect to the RSR-FC, and has a larger change rate
with respect to RSR-FC than optimal ofﬂine price with respect to
RSR-FC.
4.3.2. Relationship between the manufacturer's proﬁt and the RSR-
FC/RSR-RC
As shown in Fig. 5, the manufacturer's proﬁt is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to the RSR-RC when the RSR-FC
remains unchanged. The manufacturer's proﬁt is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to the RSR-FC when the RSR-RC
remains unchanged.
4.3.3. Relationship between the retailer's proﬁt and the RSR-FC/RSR-
RC
As shown in Fig. 6, the retailer's proﬁt is a monotonically in-
creasing function with respect to the RSR-RC when the RSR-FC
remains unchanged. The retailer's proﬁt is a monotonically de-
creasing function with respect to the RSR-FC when the RSR-RC
remains unchanged.
4.3.4. Relationship between the SC proﬁt and the RSR-FC/RSR-RC
As shown in Fig. 7, SC proﬁt is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to the RSR-RC when the RSR-FC remains
unchanged. The SC proﬁt is a monotonically increasing function
with respect to the RSR-FC when the RSR-RC remains unchanged.RSR-FC
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Fig. 4. The relationship between the optimal online/ofﬂine price, the optimal
wholesale price and the RSR-FC.
Please cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://5. Conclusion
This paper constructs a dual-channel CLSC model consisting of
single manufacturer/single retailer and researches the coordination of
SC based on cooperative advertisement input and change of recycling
rate for used products. It could be concluded that the optimized online
and ofﬂine price will be increased with increasing in advertisement
input. Under centralized decisions the optimal online/ofﬂine price and
wholesale price are monotonically decreasing functions with respect
to the RSR-RC. However, if advertisement stimulates demand growth,
the optimized ofﬂine price would be reduced with increasing of RSR-
FC under decentralized decision while the optimized online price is
not relevant to RSR-FC. In order to increase ofﬂine proﬁt, the retailer
will select ofﬂine price reduction sales strategy, but this strategy may
not be the optimized price for the retailer. When the advertisement
effect is small, the advertisement input level and proﬁts of optimized
SC are monotone increasing functions for RSR-RC. Thus, the setting for
RSR-RC is critical for coordinating SC proﬁt no matter under cen-
tralized or decentralized decision.
By comparison, both the optimal online and ofﬂine prices under
decentralized decisions are higher than those under centralized de-
cisions. Previous literatures say revenue-sharing contracts can elim-
inate double marginalization between manufacturers and retailers,
and realize SC coordination compared with wholesale contracts, but
under decentralized decisions, the optimal online/ofﬂine price
strategy cannot be implemented in the same way as underual-channel with cooperation advertising in closed-loop supply
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.07.026i
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J. Xie et al. / Int. J. Production Economics ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 9centralized decisions. Therefore, we think double marginalization
still exists in revenue-sharing contracts under decentralized deci-
sions. With the revenue allocation ratio determined, manufacturers
and retailers seek to maximize their own proﬁts through price de-
cisions in the channel directly facing end-consumers.
The contribution of this paper include two parts: Firstly, it in-
troduces advertisement cooperation into dual-channel CLSC so that
the whole model can be more integral and closer to practical condition
of economy. Under this condition, it is of practical signiﬁcance to
analyze the pricing strategy and advertisement investment strategy of
enterprise in dual-channel CLSC; secondly, different from premise for
ﬁxed recycling rate of used products in previous research (Quariguasi-
Frota-Neto and Bloemhof, 2011; Debo et al., 2006), the recycling rate in
this paper is affected by recycling channel input which is affected by
revenue sharing of retailers in reverse SC. Thus, the recycling rate is
not ﬁxed in this paper and changes with the changing of sharing
proportion. In this model, the SC proﬁts are affected by production
costs and sales price as well as RSR-RC. It solves the optimal pricing
issues of O2O dual-channel CLSC with cooperative advertisement,
which can be considered as extension for former research.
This paper can provide some practical insights for managers.
Recycling and remanufacturing is an important method for en-
terprises to reduce production cost and increase proﬁt, especially
for functional demand providing enterprises such as air condi-
tioner enterprises which provides air control service for large
building. Remanufactured equipment saves considerable cost with
no impaction on demanded function. So it is worthy for managers
to take account of how to make an efﬁcient selling-recycling-re-
manufacturing strategy. According to our conclusion, the aim of
advertising for manufacturer and distribution channel (or retailer)
is to promote production selling as well as to establish the foun-
dation of recycling in the future. To increase the enthusiasm for
selling and recycling of retailer, manufacturer may adopt two-way
revenue sharing contract to simulate retailer. When selling pro-
duction, manufacturer sells production to retailer in a low
wholesale price and shares proﬁt of production selling of retailer.
This is identical to traditional forward revenue sharing contract.
When recycling, manufacturer shares saved cost by re-
manufacturing to retailer to stimulate the enthusiasm of retailer.
This reverse revenue sharing is the main difference from tradi-
tional revenue sharing contract. Note that the share ratio of re-
verse revenue sharing affects advertising level and whole supply
chain proﬁt signiﬁcantly. Besides, manufacturer should still
maintain a well-established coordination relationship and make
the whole supply chain and its members proﬁt maximum by
centralized decision making on online and ofﬂine price.
The future research is needed since there exists many uncertainPlease cite this article as: Xie, J., et al., Coordination contracts of d
chains. International Journal of Production Economics (2016), http://factors that may affect remanufacturing efﬁciency in the practice.
These uncertainties may further affect online and ofﬂine pricing
strategy on dual-channel production and the design of revenue
sharing contract parameters. For example, the quality of used pro-
duct is not consistent. Under different quality level, the cost of re-
manufacturing is not the same. Under limited production resource,
not all the used products will be used for remanufacturing. Manu-
facturer may ﬁlter out low quality used product in the practice. Be-
sides, the amount of recycling and selling is independent in this
paper. It is acceptable in certain condition but not always. In future
work, the relationship between the amount of recycling and selling
should be taken into consideration. Our model can be improved by
making the quality level of used product endogenous variables or
adding relationship between the amount of recycling and selling. In
this way we can further discuss the coordination contract of closed-
loop supply chain and the practical importance on remanufacturing.Acknowledgment
The work was supported by the National Natural Science
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PROOF Take the second-order partial derivatives of Formula (6)
with respect to ΦP P b, , ,t e 2 and obtain Hessian Matrix.
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is not the strictly united concave function with respect to Pt
and Φ2, and also not the strictly united concave function with
respect to Pe and Φ2.
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In resolving the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives with respect to
P wande , and making them 0 we obtain Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for manufacturer's optimization problem.
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Since >P we , only the condition under λ=0 can be adopted. It can
be obtained by resolving the manufacturer's optimization problem
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
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ment contract only whenπ π π π+ > +∆ ∆ * *M R M
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